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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and the order of the Utah Supreme Court 
transferring this case to the Court of Appeals. 
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Decree, and Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered against Appellant in a 
civil action brought under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 to recover the 
reasonable value of services rendered for the placement of 
telecommunications cable under a public street. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the placement of telecommunications cable 
beneath the surface of a public road constitutes an "improvement 
upon land," such that Appellant would be liable as an "owner" 
under the contractor's bond statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et 
seq. 
2. Whether Respondent is entitled to prejudgment interest 
in an action brought under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 for the 
"reasonable value of the labor performed or materials furnished," 
where Respondent did not have a direct or express contract with 
Appellant. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(1) (1987) 
For purposes of this chapter: 
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be 
awarded a contract for the construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, 
or improvement upon land. 
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for 
construction, alteration, or repair of any 
building, structure, or improvement upon land. 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1987) 
Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to all 
persons who have performed labor or have supplied materials 
under the contract for the reasonable value of the labor 
performed or materials furnished. No action to recover on 
such liability may be commenced after the expiration of one 
year after the day on which the last of the labor was 
performed or the material was supplied by such person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Respondent Blaine Dalton (hereinafter "Dalton*) brought this 
action against Appellant The Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (hereinafter "U S WEST Communications7') under 
the contractor's bond statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2,1 to 
recover for services rendered on a subcontract it entered with 
Weule, Inc. (hereinafter "Weule"),2 the principal contractor, to 
place telecommunications cable beneath a public road in South Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (R. 2-7) Judgment for $12,856.59, plus 
prejudgment interest and costs, was entered against U S WEST 
Communications following a trial to the court. (R. 140-41, copy 
attached as Addendum A) 
1
 Dalton also asserted claims based on the mechanics' lien 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 et seq., a quasi contract theory, 
and a claim for attorney's fees, all of which were dismissed on 
summary judgment. (R. 128-29) Dalton has not appealed that ruling. 
2
 Weule was also named as a defendant, but was apparently 
never served with process inasmuch as it had filed bankruptcy. 
2 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about April 15, 1988, U S WEST Communications 
entered into a contract with Weule, whereby Weule was to install 
underground communications cable beneath a street in South Salt 
Lake City.3 (Findings of Fact % 5, R. 135-39, copy attached as 
Addendum B; Ex. 6-D; Tr. 68} 
2. On or about April 21, 1988, Weule engaged Dalton, as a 
subcontractor, to perform the entire installation of the telephone 
communication cable. (Findings of Fact f 7, R. 136; Ex. 1-P; Tr. 
6-7) Weule's contract with Dalton provided for payment of 90% of 
the amount Weule was to receive from U S WEST Communications. 
(Exhibits 1-P, 2-P; Tr. 30) Dalton started the job on about May 
1, 1988 and completed the entire installation work on or about May 
23, 1988. (Findings of Fact % 10, R. 136, Tr. 32-33) 
3. All of the work under the subcontract was performed 
within a public road right of way. (Findings of Fact f 4, R. 136; 
Tr. 23) U S WEST Communications did not own an interest in the 
property, whether in fee or by easement, but was a mere licensee, 
having obtained a permit from South Salt Lake City.4 (Tr. 72-73, 
76-77; Ex. 8) 
3
 There were three change orders to the original contract, 
memorialized in Exhibit 9-D. 
4
 The Findings of Fact incorrectly state that U S WEST 
Communications had obtained "unwritten" consent from South Salt 
Lake City. (Findings of Fact %% 4, 6, R. 136) Exhibit 8-D 
plainly shows that the permit was not "unwritten." 
3 
4. U S WEST Communications did not require or obtain a 
contractor's payment bond (Findings of Fact 1 12, R. 137), but 
paid Weule the full amount owed under the principal contract in 
the amount of $14,142.25. (Tr. 78) Weule did not pay Dalton for 
the work performed on the subcontract. (Tr. 17) 
5. Weule owes Dalton $12,365.59 for the performance of the 
subcontract. (Findings of Fact «f 19, R. 137) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. For U S WEST Communications to be liable as an "owner" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2, the work performed by Dalton must 
relate to a "building, structure, or improvement upon land." 
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the installation of 
underground cable in a public street is not an improvement upon 
land, because the work was not done as an integral part of the 
construction, alteration or repair of any particular building or 
structure. The work performed by Dalton fails to meet even the 
threshold requirement of an improvement, since it does not benefit 
or add value to the land, which is a public street. Furthermore, 
only real property can qualify as an improvement under section 14-
2-1. Because the underground cable has not been annexed or 
adapted to the public road it is personalty, not realty; hence the 
contractor's bond statute does not apply to the present case. 
2. Dalton is not entitled to prejudgment interest because 
his claim was not liquidated as to U S WEST Communications. Under 
4 
Utah law, prejudgment interest is only allowed where the claim is 
liquidated. A liquidated claim must be calculable with 
mathematical accuracy. Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 allows recovery 
for the reasonable value of labor performed and materials 
furnished, which cannot be calculated with precision when it is a 
disputed question for the trier of fact; hence it is not 
liquidated and therefore is not the proper subject for prejudgment 
interest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS IS NOT AN "OWNER" WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-2-1 BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION OF 
TELEPHONE CABLE IS NOT AN "IMPROVEMENT UPON LAND." 
The principal issue in this appeal is whether Utah's 
contractor's bond statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et seq. (1987) 
applies in the circumstances of this case. Section 14-2-2 of that 
statute states in part: "Any owner who fails to obtain a payment 
bond is liable to all persons who have performed labor or have 
supplied materials under the contract . . . ." (emphasis added,) 
The question, therefore, is whether U S WEST Communications is an 
"owner" as that word is used in the statute. 
The statute does not require ownership of an interest in land 
to qualify a person as an "owner;"5 rather, section 14-2-1(1)(b) 
5
 Whether U S WEST Communications had an interest in the 
public road was apparently an important consideration to the trial 
court's decision (Conclusions of Law f 1; R. 138). U S WEST 
Communications merely had a license to enter the road and install 
the cable. (See Exhibit 8D) A license does not create any title 
or interest in property. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Rivera, 701 P.2d 
982 (Mont. 1985). However, because the 1987 version of section 
5 
defines "owner" as "any person contracting for construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement 
upon land."6 Dalton has not alleged that the installation of 
underground cable constituted the construction, alteration, or 
repair of a "building" or "structure." Therefore, whether U S 
WEST Communications is an "owner," and hence liable under section 
14-2-2, depends upon whether the installation of underground cable 
beneath a public road constitutes an "improvement upon land." 
A. The installation of telephone cable was not an 
"improvement upon land.* 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the contractor's bond 
statute as being "applicable only to contracts involving buildings 
or structures of some sort." Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 
P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1956).7 In Backus, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that leveling of land alone was not an improvement upon land 
under the contractor's bond statute. 
Subsequent Utah cases have confirmed that work must be done 
14-2-1 defines an "owner" in terms other than a holder of an 
interest in property, it is irrelevant whether U S WEST 
Communications' permit to place telephone cable in the public road 
constituted an interest in land. 
6
 The statute was amended in 1989, although the amendment 
does not alter its substance. For purposes of this argument, 
reference will be to the 1987 version of the statute, which 
appears in Addendum C. The 1989 version appears in Addendum D. 
7
 Although Backus involved an interpretation of Utah's 
previous contractor's bond statute, the court's reasoning is 
equally applicable here, since identical terms ("construction ... 
alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement 
upon land") are also at issue in the present case. 
6 
as an integral part of the construction, alteration, or repair of 
a building or structure to qualify as an "improvement upon land" 
within the meaning of the statute. In fact, no Utah court has 
ever required a contractor's bond for work on land without any 
direct connection to work on a building or similar structure. 
In Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 
1967), for example, the court held that landscaping was an 
improvement upon land because it "was done as an integral part of 
the building of a home." The Frehner court explained: "The 
distinction [from Backus] is that [in Backus] the leveling of land 
was not done in connection with any building, structure, or 
improvement upon the land." Id. at 449. In the present case, the 
underground cable is not an improvement under the statute because 
it was not installed as an integral part of a building or 
structure. 
Both Backus and Frehner relied on the same principle of 
statutory construction, the doctrine of ejusdem generis. As 
expressed in Backus, 
The reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent, 
gathered from the statute, would seem to make it applicable 
only to contracts involving buildings or structures of some 
sort. . . . 
. . . 
Nor do we feel that it is necessary to call upon any 
rules of statutory interpretation since the language seems 
not to require interpretation. However, under a familiar 
rule of construction the expression 'or improvement upon 
land7 can only refer to improvements of a character similar 
to those immediately before mentioned. (Sutherland Statutory 
ConstructionF 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, p. 393, Sec. 4909). 
294 P.2d at 704-05 (emphasis added). In Frehner. the Court further 
7 
explained that the rule of construction referred to in Backus is 
the Rule of Ejusdem Generis, sometimes called Lord 
Tenterden's Rule, the doctrine being that where an 
enumeration of specific things is followed by some more 
general word or phrase, such general word or phrase is to be 
held to refer to things of the same kind with respect to a 
classification which immediately precedes it. 
Frehner, 424 P.2d at 449. 
A related principle of statutory construction also supports 
denial of liability in this case. In Graco Fishing and Rental 
Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1078-79 
(Utah 1988), the court held that rental charges were not covered 
under the contractor's bond statute, because at the time, they 
were not expressly mentioned therein. Quoting from Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis. 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959), 
the court stated: 
"While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally 
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote 
justice, it is equally true that they should not be distorted 
beyond the intent of the legislature. This principle is 
particularly applicable in a situation of this kind where a 
liability is imposed upon the property owner beyond what he 
contracted to bear for the improvement of his property. In 
order to impose upon him such additional burdens the law must 
clearly spell out the responsibility." 
Id. at 1079 (emphasis added in Graco, not in Stanton). In the 
present case, the statute does not clearly spell out the 
responsibility of a utility company to obtain a bond for the 
placement of cable beneath a public street; indeed, the language 
"building, structure, or improvement upon land" implies that other 
types of construction are excluded from coverage. Therefore, 
under Utah law, U S WEST Communications should not be held liable 
8 
for failing to procure a bond in the circumstances of this case. 
Utah cases in the area of mechanic's lien law support a 
conclusion that the installation of underground cable does not 
constitute an improvement upon land under the contractor's bond 
statute. In King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d 
339, 374 P.2d 254, 255 (Utah 1962), the court noted that "because 
of the common purpose of these lien and contractor's bond 
statutes, and their practically identical language, adjudications 
as to what is lienable under the former are helpful in determining 
the proper application of the latter." See also, Allen Steel Co. 
v. Crossroads Plaza Associates, 119 Utah Adv. Rep 6, 14 (filed 
Oct. 6, 1989); Graco Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood 
Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1078-79 (Utah 1988). In the 
present case, the trial court granted U S WEST Communications' 
motion for summary judgment on Dalton's mechanic's lien claim. 
(R. 51-52, 66-94, 128-29) Under the cases cited, that fact alone 
would tend to support dismissal of the contractor's bond claim, 
since it would defeat the "common purpose" of the two statutes to 
deny liability under one, while imposing liability under the 
other. In Allen Steel, the Supreme Court stated: 
In light of our discussion infra affirming the trial court's 
finding that the landowners/lessors are not liable under the 
mechanic's lien statute, that is an additional reason why the 
landowners/lessors are not liable under the contractor's bond 
statute. 
119 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. 
Other mechanic's lien cases also support dismissal of the 
9 
contractor's bond claim in this case. In Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 
P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1987), this Court held that a sewer stub-in 
placed within the boundaries of a subdivision was not an 
improvement upon land for purposes of the mechanics7 lien statute. 
The Court stated: "[T]he installation of the sewer line was an 
incidental item of work done as a part of an overall valley-wide 
sewer project . . . for the benefit of the sewer project." Id. at 
1053. 
On the other hand, in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. 
C.N. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that installation of a sewer system within a 
subdivision was lienable. In distinguishing First of Denver, the 
Court in Tripp noted the difference between a sewer stub-in and an 
entire sewer system built as part of a subdivision project. 747 
P.2d at 1054. The basis for the distinction was whether the 
installation was an integral part of the development of a specific 
building or buildings. 
The implications of the cited cases to the present case are 
obvious. Here, the length of telephone cable installed under the 
public street was completely independent of any building project 
or structure. Similar to Tripp, the telephone cable was 
presumably installed as part of a general project to improve U S 
WEST Communications' telephone system.8 It was also installed at 
8
 In the present case, there was no evidence as to the 
purpose for the telecommunications cable, nor that it was ever 
connected to a specific building, subdivision or other structure, 
10 
no charge to any particular building project, and no contractor or 
subcontractor could claim a lien on the public street. See Tripp, 
747 P.2d at 1053. Therefore, to be consistent with these Utah 
precedents, this Court must reverse the trial court's decision and 
hold that the underground telephone cable did not constitute an 
"improvement upon land" under the contractor's bond statute. 
B. The installation of underground telephone cable did not 
add any value to the public street. 
The purpose of the mechanics' lien and contractor's bond 
statutes is to protect against an uncompensated increase in the 
value of real property. King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln 
Company. 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254, 255 (Utah 1962). See also. 
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Associates, 
600 P.2d 521, 525 (Utah 1979); Frehner v. Morton. 18 Utah 2d 422, 
424 P.2d 446, 447 (Utah 1967). If work does not "add directly to 
the value of the property," it is not covered. See Daniels v. 
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 771 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 
App. 1989) (inspection and repair of water damage held not to 
extend the time for filing a notice of lien). "For work to add to 
the value of property it is necessary that the work benefit the 
specific property in question." Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 715 
nor that it became part of U S WEST Communications' 
telecommunications network or otherwise was placed in operation. 
(See Tr. 60-62) 
11 
(Utah App. 1988).9 In Rotta. this Court held that the clearing of 
brush and trees and removal of dirt from two parcels of land for 
use elsewhere did not constitute lienable work as to the parcels 
from which the dirt was removed. This Court concluded: "The 
statute has no application to the circumstances as in this case 
where the work was done for another project." 756 P.2d at 715. 
By analogy, under the rule stated in Rotta, the contractor's 
bond statute does not protect the work performed in the present 
case, because the underground cable in no way benefits the public 
road where it was installed. The only conceivable benefit the 
cable provided was to U S WEST Communications' telecommunications 
system, not to the public road. At the trial, Dalton did not even 
attempt to introduce evidence to prove that the value of the land 
was improved by installation of the telecommunications cable.10 
To hold that a length of underground telephone cable is an 
improvement to a public street, even though it does not add value 
to the street, would be completely contrary to the established 
purpose of the contractor's bond statute, to prevent the 
uncompensated increase in value of the real property. Because the 
underground cable did not benefit the specific property or 
9
 In Rotta, this court held that the clearing of brush and 
removal of dirt from two parcels of land for the benefit of a 
building project on a separate parcel of land was not an 
improvement for mechanics' lien purposes. Rotta, 756 P.2d 713. 
1 0
 Indeed, the cable may actually have devalued the land, in 
the sense that a purchaser of the highway would be more reluctant 
to purchase, knowing that a utility line and its at-tendant dangers 
and potential liabilities lay beneath the surface. 
12 
increase the value of the public street, it does not meet the 
"threshold requirement" of an "improvement," Rotta, 756 P.2d at 
715. Therefore, U S WEST Communications is not liable as an 
"owner" under sections 14-2-1 and -2 of the Utah Code. 
C. The underground telephone cable is not real property. 
In King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co.. 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 
P.2d 254, 256 (1962), the court stated: 
To qualify under [the mechanics' lien and the contractor's 
bond statutes], it is necessary that there be an annexation 
to the land, or to some permanent structure upon it, so that 
the materials in question can properly be regarded as having 
become a part of the realty; or a fixture appurtenant to it; 
and this must have been done with the intention of making it 
a permanent part thereof. 
See also, Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn.. Ill 
P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1989) (investor profits are not 
lienable). In Paul Mueller Company v. Cache Valley Dairy 
Association, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that whey drying equipment, attached to the cement floor of a 
building by bolts, welding, wiring, and ducts, was not real 
property for mechanics' lien purposes. The court identified the 
following three criteria to be considered in determining whether 
materials have become fixtures: 
(1) [the] manner in which the item is attached or annexed to 
realty; (2) whether the item is adaptable to the particular 
use of the realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to 
make an item a permanent part of the realty. 
Id. at 1283. The court determined that the personal property was 
not annexed for mechanics7 lien purposes because the equipment 
13 
could be removed easily and without damage to the building. Id. 
Also, the whey drying equipment was not adapted to the property 
even though the building housing the equipment was used solely for 
whey drying. "Equipment is not 'adapted' to the use of real 
property where the real property itself is adaptable to multiple 
uses and where it is solely the presence of the equipment itself 
which determines the purpose served by the real property." Id. 
In the present case, Dalton did not submit any proof that the 
underground cable was ever annexed to the land in the manner 
required by Paul Mueller Company. Mere physical attachment alone 
is not sufficient proof. Id. Neither has there been an 
adaptation of the cable to the use of the real property. The 
underground telephone cable does not further the specific purpose 
of the road. The presence of the underground cable has not 
determined, enhanced, improved, or in any way affected the use of 
the public road. It is a public roadway in spite of the existence 
of the underground cable. Hence the contractor's bond statute, 
which only applies to realty, is not applicable in this case. 
In summary, the contractor's bond statute does not apply in 
this case because the telecommunications cable was not installed 
as an integral part of the construction, alteration, or repair of 
a building or structure, it did not add any value to the realty, 
and it was not annexed to the realty. 
14 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ORDERING 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AGAINST U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS FOR AN 
UNLIQUIDATED CLAIM. 
The law is well established in Utah that a prevailing party 
is only entitled to prejudgment interest where the loss is fixed 
as of a particular time and the amount of the loss can be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy. Joraensen v. John Clav and 
Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983); Biork v. April Industries, 
Inc.. 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). Under Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-
2, a plaintiff may recover the "reasonable value" of work 
performed and materials supplied, which is not necessarily the 
price at which he agreed to furnish the work and materials.11 
See, e.g., Steel Components, Inc. v. United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co., 28 Utah 2d 25, 497 P.2d 646 (1972); Asphalt 
Products, Inc. v. Paulos Auto Co., 17 Utah 2d 402, 413 P.2d 596 
(1966). The statute specifically establishes the contract price 
as a ceiling on the amount of recovery. That, however, does not 
allow an inference that the contract price, by itself, establishes 
a reasonable value. Since reasonable value is necessarily 
something about which reasonable persons may differ, and therefore 
cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy, Dalton7s claim 
against U S WEST Communications does not qualify for prejudgment 
1 1
 Conclusion of Law #4 misstates the applicable law in 
stating that U S WEST Communications is "liable under 14-2-2, 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended for unpaid labor and materials, which 
constitute an improvement upon the land," rather than stating that 
liability under the statute is for the "reasonable value" of labor 
and materials. (R. 138) 
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interest under Utah law. 
The record in this case supports the conclusion that the 
amount in question was not liquidated because there was a bona 
fide dispute as to the reasonable value of the work performed. 
Dalton's evidence of reasonable value consisted solely of his own 
opinion. (Tr. 17-18) That opinion was founded, upon weak and 
imprecise evidence of the actual costs involved in the job. 
For example, although Dalton testified that he kept records 
of the wages paid and actual costs incurred for the rental of 
equipment, he did not produce them at the trial, and could not 
tell how much he paid any one employee. (Tr. 36-37) Rather, he 
"estimated" that the wages he paid were $5,000 to $6,000 (Tr. 39, 
46). There was no evidence that the wages he paid were customary 
in the industry or the locality; in fact, he testified that the 
wages paid were "12 to $15 a hour" (Tr. 36), even though his bid 
for some of the work used a figure of $10 per hour (Tr. 39-40, Ex. 
7-D).12 
Dalton also testified that he procured "approximately" $2,100 
worth of gravel for backfill (Tr. 47), that dump truck rental ran 
"about $35 per hour" (Tr. 50-51), that the total rental for each 
of the dump trucks was "around $1,500, something like that" (Tr. 
51) and that the latter figure was just "a guess" (Tr. 51). He 
agreed that he could not tell what his total out of pocket costs 
were on the job (Tr. 49). Furthermore, Dalton was unsure when the 
1 2
 Three of the four employees were family members. (Tr. 35) 
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job started (Tr. 32-34), how many employees worked on the job 
(Tr. 34-35), or exactly what their hours were (Tr. 33). He 
testified that although the job took 15 days or less to complete, 
he rented a backhoe for a full month at a charge of $2,800, 
although he could have rented it at an daily rate of $150, which 
would have resulted in a total backhoe cost of $2,250 for 15 days 
of work. (Tr. 47-49) 
Even if it were held that such evidence was sufficient to 
sustain a conclusion that the amount Dalton sought represented the 
reasonable value of the work, it cannot remotely be held to be a 
liquidated amount, such as is required for the imposition of 
prejudgment interest. 
In Modern Builders. Inc. v. Manke, 27 Wash. App. 86, 615 P.2d 
1332 (1980), the court denied prejudgment interest in an action to 
foreclose a labor and materialmen7s lien on a theory of quantum 
meruit. The court stated: 
Prejudgment interest may be recovered only if a claim is 
liquidated or otherwise computed by a fixed standard in the 
contract without reference to extrinsic evidence, [citation 
omitted] By its very nature, an award of damages based upon 
quantum meruit is not liquidated and is not readily 
ascertainable in the parties7 contract. Therefore, 
prejudgment interest may not be awarded when a labor and 
materialmen's lien is set by quantum meruit. 
615 P.2d at 1339. See also. Sherwood B. Korssioen. Inc. v. 
Heiman, 765 P.2d 301, 307 (Wash. App. 1988). 
Because Dalton's claim against U S WEST Communications 
remained uncertain and incapable of precise calculation until the 
trier of fact determined the reasonable value of his services, 
17 
Dalton is not entitled to prejudgment interest. See Arcon 
Construction Co. v. S.D. Cement Plant, 349 N.W.2d 407, 416 (S.D. 
1984) ("A party is not entitled to prejudgment interest if the 
amount of damages remains uncertain until determined by the trial 
court.") 
CONCLUSION 
U S WEST Communications requests that the Utah Court of 
Appeals reverse the district court's judgment. The proper 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 establishes that U S 
WEST Communications was not an "owner" under the statute, because 
the installation of telecommunications cable beneath a public 
street is not an improvement upon land, adds nothing to the value 
of the land, and is not realty. The plain language of the statute 
simply does not permit its application to this kind of case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l8 day of December, 1989. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
Floyd K. Jensen, Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following on the /ffi»day of December, 1989: 
Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
Pace & Parsons 
350 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE DALTON, dba 
C & D CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEULE, INC. and 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
Defendants, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 88-04963 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on Monday, 
May 1, 1989, at 9:00 o'clock A.M., the Plaintiff being present in 
Court with his Counsel, Lorin N. Pace, the Defendant being present 
by its representatives and with Counsel, Floyd A. Jensen, and the 
parties having presented exhibits and sworn testimony, and good 
cause therefor appearing the Court now makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. BLAINE DALTON, the Plaintiff, is an individual doing 
business as C & D CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a sole proprietorship. 
2. Defendant WEULE, INC., is a corporation qualified to 
do business in the State of Utah. 
3. Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY is a corporation qualified to do business in the State of 
Utah. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company also does 
business under the name of U.S. WEST COMMUNICATIONS. 
4c Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY prior to April 21, 1988, had obtained unwritten consent of 
South Salt Lake City to lay a communications cable underground a 
distance of about three (3) blocks through the streets of South 
Salt Lake City. 
5. Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY entered into a written contract with Defendant WEULE, INC. 
to install the underground communications cable in South Salt Lake 
City. 
6. The unwritten consent to lay a communications cable 
in the streets of South Salt Lake City was an interest in land 
belonging to MOUNTAIN STATES TELEHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY. 
7. Defendant WEULE, INC. entered into a subcontract 
agreement with Plaintiff BLAINE DALTON, dba C & D CONSTRUCTION, to 
lay the cable as referred to above. 
8. Plaintiff provided labor, materials and equipment to 
perform the subcontract. 
9. Defendant WEULE, INC. agreed to pay Plaintiff the sum 
of $12,856.59 for the execution of the subcontract. 
10. Plaintiff commenced work about May 1, 1988, and 
completed the work on or about May 23, 1988. 
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11. The total contract to lay the cable was in excess of 
$2,000,00. 
12. Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY did not require WEULE, INC. to post a bond. 
13. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against WEULE, INC. but 
has been unable to collect any amounts on said judgment* 
14. The improvements upon the land provided to Defendant 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY by Plaintiff were 
reasonably worth $12,856.59. 
15. On or about the 14th day of June, 1988, a registered 
letter was sent to Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY making demand on the Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY for payment and giving notice of a 
claim on the bond. Said notice was mailed within ninety (90) days 
of the completion of the work. 
16. The legal action herein was commenced prior to one 
(1) year after completion of the work 
17. Plaintiff subcontracted a portion of the contract and 
that subcontractor has not yet been paid. 
18. Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY is the owner of the improvements upon the land created by 
the contract performance. 
19. Plaintiff is owed the sum of $12,856.59, plus 
interest, from May 23, 1988f to date of payment and Plaintiff has 
not been paid. 
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20. Based upon 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the 
Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY is 
indebted to the Plaintiff in the amount of $12,856.59, plus 
interest from May 23, 1988, to date of payment. 
The Court now having made its Findings of Fact, now makes 
the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The consent to lay a communications cable through the 
streets of South Salt Lake City is an interest in land. 
2. The laying of the cable through the streets of South 
Salt Lake City is an improvement upon an interest in land under 
U.C.A. 14-2-2. 
3. Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY having obtained the permission of South Salt Lake City to 
lay a communications cable through the streets of South Salt Lake 
City and MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY having 
contracted for the laying of said cable was a contract for 
improvement upon the land. 
4. Defendant MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY was obligated by statute to require a bond from its 
contractor WEULE, INC. and did not do so, and is therefore liable 
under 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, for unpaid labor and 
materials, which constituted an improvement upon the land. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY in the amount of 
-4-
TWELVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX AND 59/100 DOLLARS 
($12,856.59), plus interest from May 23, 2988. 
6. Plaintiff, C & D CONSTRUCTION should be ordered to 
pay an unpaid materials and labor claim in the amount of THREE 
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($3,767.00) 
to ERICKSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and to indemnify and hold harm-
less Defendant, MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
against any claims from said Company. 
DATED this 3ft day of JfcJy, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
By OQ^feyl ) rJu*^A)Su) 
JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney for Defendant 
<A^-i-0^ 
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JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Case No. 88-04963 
The above-entitled matter was tried before the Court 
sitting without a jury on Monday, May 1, 1989. The Plaintiff, 
BLAINE DALTON, was present in Court with his Counsel, Lorin N. 
Pace. The Defendant, MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, was present by its representatives and with Counsel, 
Floyd A. Jensen. The witnesses of the parties were sworn and 
testified and exhibits introduced, and the Court having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the 
following Judgment and Decree. 
Plaintiff is granted Judgment over and against Defendant 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY in the amount of 
f\r\f\< /ITS 
TWELVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX AND 59/100 DOLLARS 
($12f856,59). Plaintiff shall pay out of said Judgment the amount 
of THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS 
($3,767.00) to ERICKSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY for subcontract 
asphalt work on the Weule Contract, Plaintiff shall hold Defen-
dant harmless and indemnify Defendant against any claim from said 
Erickson Construction Company. 
DATED this £p day of Me-r> 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
By. 
Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney for Defendant 
LORIN N. PACE, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Certificate of Mailing 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree in the above entitled case 
to FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney for Defendant, MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the United States 




UTAH CODE ANN. 





14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required — 
Right of action — Notice. 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment bond — 
Liability. 
14-2-3, 14-2-4. Repealed. 
14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required — 
Right of action — Notice. 
(1) For purposes of this chapter 
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or 
may be awarded a contract for the construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or 
improvement upon land. 
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for 
construction, alteration, or repair of any build-
ing, structure, or improvement upon land. 
(2) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in 
amount, for the construction, alteration, or repair of 
any building, structure, or improvement upon land is 
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain 
from the contractor a payment bond complying with 
Subsection (3), which shall become binding upon the 
award of the contract to the contractor. 
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or 
sureties satisfactory to the owner for the protection of 
all persons supplying labor and material in the prose-
cution of the work provided for in the contract in a 
sum equal to the contract price. 
(4) (a) Any person who has furnished labor or ma-
terial in the prosecution of the work provided for 
in such contract, in respect of which a payment 
bond is furnished under this chapter, and who 
has not been paid in full therefor within 90 days 
after the day on which the last of the labor was 
performed by him or material was supplied by 
him for which the claim is made, may sue on the 
payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time 
the suit is filed and may prosecute the action for 
the amount due him. Any person having a con-
tract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but 
no express or implied contract with the contrac-
tor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of 
action upon the payment bond upon giving writ-
ten notice to the contractor within 90 days from 
the date on which such person performed the last 
of the labor or supplied the last of the material 
for which the claim is made. The person shall 
state in the notice the amount claimed and the 
name of the party for whom the labor was per-
formed or to whom the material was supplied. 
The notice shall be served by registered or certi-
fied mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor at 
any place the contractor maintains an office or 
conducts business. 
(b) Any suit instituted under this section shall 
be brought in the district court of any county in 
which the contract was to be performed, and not 
elsewhere. No such suit may be commenced after 
the expiration of one year after the day on which 
the last of the labor was performed or material 
was supplied by the person. The obligee named in 
the bond need not be joined as a party in the suit. 
(5) The payment bond shall be exhibi ted to a n y 
interes ted person upon r e q u e s t 19S7 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment 
bond — Liability. 
Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is 
liable to all persons who have performed labor or 
have supplied materials under the contract for the 
reasonable value of the labor performed or materials 
furnished. No action to recover on such liability may 
be commenced after the expiration of one year after 
the day on which the last of the labor was performed 
or the material was supplied by such person. 1967 
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14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required — 
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys* 
fees. 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment bond — 
Liability. 
14-2-3, 14-2-4. Repealed. 
14-2-5. Preliminary notice requirement. 
14-2-1. Definitions — Payment bond required — 
Right of action — Notice — Attorneys' 
fees. 
(1) For purposes of this chapter: 
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or 
may be awarded a contract for the construction, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or 
improvement upon land. 
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for 
construction, alteration, or repair of any build-
ing, structure, or improvement upon land. 
(2) Before any contract exceeding $2,000 in 
amount for the construction, alteration, or repair of 
any building, structure, or improvement upon land is 
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain 
from the contractor a payment bond complying with 
Subsection (3). The bond shall become binding upon 
the award of the contract to the contractor. 
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or 
sureties satisfactory to the owner for the protection of 
all persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or 
material in the prosecution of the work provided for 
in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price. 
(4) A person shall have a right of action on a pay-
ment bond under this chapter for any unpaid amount 
due him if: 
(a) he has furnished labor, services, equip-
ment, or material in the prosecution of the work 
provided for in the contract for which the pay-
ment bond is furnished under this chapter; and 
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days 
after the last day on which he performed the 
labor or service or supplied the equipment or ma-
terial for which the claim is made. 
(5) An action under this section shall be brought in 
a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where 
the contract was to be performed and not elsewhere. 
The action is barred if not commenced within one 
year after the last day on which the claimant per-
formed the labor or service or supplied the equipment 
or material on which the claim is based. The obligee 
named in the bond need not be joined as a party to the 
action. In any action upon a bond, the court may 
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party, which fees shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any 
interested person upon request. 
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this 
chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party. 1989 
14-2-2. Fa i lu re of owner to obtain payment 
bond — Liability. 
(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond 
is liable to each person who performed labor or ser-
vice or supplied equipment or materials under the 
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or ser-
vice performed or the equipment or materials fur-
nished up to but not exceeding the contract price. 
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be 
commenced after the expiration of one year after the 
day on which the last of the labor or service was per-
formed or the equipment or material was supplied by 
the person. 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in 
the action. ifty 
